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Abstract
Modern smartphones contain motion sensors, such as ac-
celerometers and gyroscopes. These sensors have many
useful applications; however, they can also be used to
uniquely identify a phone by measuring anomalies in the
signals, which are a result from manufacturing imper-
fections. Such measurements can be conducted surrep-
titiously in the browser and can be used to track users
across applications, websites, and visits.
We analyze techniques to mitigate such device finger-
printing either by calibrating the sensors to eliminate the
signal anomalies, or by adding noise that obfuscates the
anomalies. To do this, we first develop a highly accurate
fingerprinting mechanism that combines multiple motion
sensors and makes use of (inaudible) audio stimulation to
improve detection. We then collect measurements from a
large collection of smartphones and evaluate the impact
of calibration and obfuscation techniques on the classi-
fier accuracy.
1 Introduction
Smartphones are equipped with motion sensors, such as
accelerometers and gyroscopes, that are available to ap-
plications and website and enable a variety of novel uses.
These same sensors, however, can threaten user privacy
by enabling sensor fingerprinting. Manufacturing imper-
fections result in each sensor having unique characteris-
tics in their produced signal. These characteristics can
be captured in the form of a fingerprint and used to track
users across repeat visits. The sensor fingerprint can
be used to supplement or replace other privacy-invasive
tracking technologies, such as cookies, or canvas finger-
printing [44]. Since the fingerprint relies on the physi-
cal characteristics of a particular device, it is immune to
defenses such as clearing cookies and private browsing
modes.
We carry out a detailed investigation the feasibility of
fingerprinting of motion sensors in smartphones. Practi-
cal fingerprinting faces several challenges. During a typ-
ical web browsing session, a smart phone is either held in
a user’s hand, resulting in noisy motion inputs, or is rest-
ing on a flat surface, minimizing the amount of sensor
input. Additionally, web APIs for accessing motion sen-
sor data have significantly lower resolution than is avail-
able to the operating systems and applications. We show
that, using machine learning techniques, it is possible to
combine a large number of features from both the ac-
celerometer and gyroscope sensor streams and produce
highly accurate classification despite these challenges.
In some cases, we can improve the classifier accuracy
by using an inaudible sound, played through the speak-
ers, to stimulate the motion sensors. We evaluate our
techniques in a variety of lab settings; additionally, we
collected data from volunteer participants over the web,
capturing a wide variety of smartphone models and oper-
ating systems. In our experiments, a web browsing ses-
sion lasting under a minute is still sufficient to generate a
fingerprint that can be used in to recognize the phone in
the future.
We next investigate two potential countermeasures to
sensor fingerprinting. First, we consider the use of cal-
ibration to eliminate some of the error that results from
manufacturing imperfections. Promisingly, we find that
calibrating the accelerometer is easy and has a significant
impact on classification accuracy. Gyroscope calibration,
however, is more challenging without specialized equip-
ment, and attempts to calibrate the gyroscope by hand do
not result in an effective countermeasure.
An alternative countermeasure is obfuscation, which
introduces additional noise to the sensor readings in the
hopes of hiding the natural errors. Obfuscation has the
advantage of not requiring a calibration step; we find
that by adding noise that is similar in magnitude to the
natural errors that result from manufacturing, we can re-
duce the accuracy of fingerprinting more effectively than
by calibration. We also investigate the possibility of us-
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ing higher magnitude noise, as well as adding temporal
disturbances to obfuscate frequency domain features. At
high levels of noise, fingerprinting accuracy is greatly re-
duced, though such noise is likely to impair the utility of
motion sensors.
Roadmap. The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows. We present background information and re-
lated works in Section 2. In Section 3, we briefly discuss
why accelerometers and gyroscopes can be used to gen-
erate unique fingerprints. In Section 4, we describe the
different temporal and spectral features considered in our
experiments, along with the classification algorithms and
metrics used in our evaluations. We present our finger-
printing results in Section 5. Section 6 describes our
countermeasure techniques to sensor fingerprinting. We
briefly discuss some deployment considerations in Sec-
tion 7. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.
2 Fingerprinting Background
Human fingerprints, due to their unique nature, are a
very popular tool used to identify people in forensic and
biometric applications [25, 51]. Researchers have long
sought to find an equivalent of fingerprints in computer
systems by finding characteristics that can help identify
an individual device. Such fingerprints exploit variation
in both the hardware and software of devices to aid in
identification.
As early as 1960, the US government used unique
transmission characteristics to track mobile transmit-
ters [36]. Later, with the introduction of cellular net-
work researchers were able to successfully distinguish
transmitters by analyzing the spectral characteristics of
the transmitted radio signal [50]. Researchers have
suggested using radio-frequency fingerprints to enhance
wireless authentication [38, 45], as well as localiza-
tion [48]. Others have leveraged the minute manufac-
turing imperfections in network interface cards (NICs)
by analyzing the radio-frequency of the emitted sig-
nals [22, 31]. Computer clocks have also been used for
fingerprinting: Moon et al. showed that network devices
tend to have a unique and constant clock skews [42];
Kohno et al. exploited this to uniquely distinguish net-
work devices through TCP and ICMP timestamps [35].
Software can also serve as a distinguishing feature,
as different devices have a different installed software
base. Researchers have long been exploiting the dif-
ference in the protocol stack installed on IEEE 802.11
compliant devices. Desmond et al. [27] have looked at
distinguishing unique devices over Wireless Local Area
Networks (WLANs) simply by performing timing analy-
sis on the 802.11 probe request packets. Others have in-
vestigated subtle differences in the firmware and device
drivers running on IEEE 802.11 compliant devices [30].
802.11 MAC headers have also been used to uniquely
track devices [32]. Moreover, there are well-known open
source toolkits like Nmap [39] and Xprobe [56] that can
remotely fingerprint an operating system by analyzing
unique responses from the TCP/IP networking stack.
Browser Fingerprinting A common application of
fingerprinting is to track a user across multiple visits to
a website, or a collection of sites. Traditionally, this
was done with the aid of cookies explicitly stored by
the browser. However, privacy concerns have prompted
web browsers to implement features that clear the cookie
store, as well as private browsing modes that do not store
cookies long-term. This has prompted site operators to
develop other means of uniquely identifying and tracking
users. Eckersley’s Panopticon project showed that many
browsers can be uniquely identified by enumerating in-
stalled fonts and other browser characteristics, easily ac-
cessible via JavaScript [29]. A more advanced technique
uses HTML5 canvas elements to fingerprint the fonts
and rendering engines used by the browser [44]. Others
have proposed the use of performance benchmarks for
differentiating between JavaScript engines [43]. Lastly,
browsing history can to used to profile and track on-
line users [47]. Numerous studies have found evi-
dence of these and other techniques being used in the
wild [19, 20, 46]. A number of countermeasures to these
techniques exist; typically they disable or restrict the
ability of a website to probe the characteristics of a web
browser. We expect that smartphones are less suscep-
tible to browser fingerprinting due to a more integrated
hardware and software base resulting in less variability,
though we are unaware of an exploration of smartphone
browser fingerprinting.
Sensor Fingerprinting Smartphones do, however,
possess an array of sensors that can be used to finger-
print them. Two studies have looked at fingerprinting
smartphone microphones and speakers [26, 57]. These
techniques, however, require access to the microphone,
which is typically controlled with a separate permission
due to the obvious privacy concerns with the ability to
capture audio. Bojinov et al. [21] additionally consider
using accelerometers, which are not considered sensitive
and do not require a separate permission. Their tech-
niques, however, rely on having the user perform a cali-
bration of the accelerometer (see 6.1), the parameters of
which are used to distinguish phones. Dey et al. [28] ap-
ply machine learning techniques to create an accelerom-
eter fingerprint, but they require the vibration motor to
be active to stimulate the accelerometer sensor; in the
absence of stimulation, they report an average precision
and recall of only 65%.
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In contrast, our work studies phones that are in a natu-
ral web-browsing setting, either in a user’s hand or rest-
ing on a flat surface. Additionally, we consider the simul-
taneous use of both accelerometer and gyroscope to pro-
duce a more accurate fingerprint. Inspired by prior work
that uses the gyroscope to recover audio signals [41], we
also stimulate the gyroscope with an inaudible tone. Fi-
nally, we propose and evaluate several countermeasures
to reduce fingerprinting accuracy without entirely block-
ing access to the motion sensors.
3 A Closer Look at Motion Sensors
In this section we briefly take a closer look at motion
sensors like accelerometer and gyroscope that are em-
bedded in today’s smartphones. This will provide an un-
derstanding of how they can be used to uniquely finger-
print smartphones. Accelerometer and gyroscope sen-
sors in modern smartphones are based on Micro Electro
Mechanical Systems (MEMS). STMicroelectronics [16]
and InvenSense [6] are among the top vendors supply-
ing MEMS-based accelerometer and gyroscope sensor to
different smartphone manufacturers [15]. Traditionally,
Apple [7, 8]1 and Samsung [4, 5] favor using STMicro-
electronics motion sensors, while Google [13, 14] tends
to use InvenSense sensors.
3.1 Accelerometer
Accelerometer is a device that measures proper acceler-
ation. Proper acceleration is different from coordinate
acceleration (linear acceleration) as it measures the g-
force. For example, an accelerometer at rest on a surface
will measure an acceleration of g = 9.81ms−2 straight
upwards, while for a free falling object it will measure
an acceleration of zero. MEMS-based accelerometers
are based on differential capacitors [10]. Figure 1 shows
the internal architecture of a MEMS-based accelerome-
ter. As we can we there are several pairs of fixed elec-
trodes and a movable seismic mass. Under zero force the
distances d1 and d2 are equal and as a result the two ca-
pacitors are equal, but a change in force will cause the
movable seismic mass to shift closer to one of the fixed
electrodes (i.e., d1 6= d2) causing a change in the gener-
ated capacitance. This difference in capacitance is de-
tected and amplified to produce a voltage proportional to
the acceleration. The slightest gap between the structural
electrodes, introduced during the manufacturing process,
can cause a change in the capacitance. Also the flexibil-
ity of the seismic mass can be slightly different from one
chip to another. This form of minute imprecisions in the
1However, iphone 6 has been reported to use motion sensors pro-
duced by InvenSense.
electro-mechanical structure induce subtle imperfections
in accelerometer chips.
Seismic Mass
Movable
Anchor
Fixed Electrode
1d d2
Figure 1: Internal architecture of a MEMS accelerometer. Dif-
ferential capacitance is proportional to the applied acceleration.
3.2 Gyroscope
Gyroscope measures the rate of rotation (in rads−1)
along the device’s three axes. MEMS-based gyroscopes
use the Coriolis effect to measure the angular rate.
Whenever an angular velocity of ω is exerted on a mov-
ing mass of weight m and velocity vˆ, the object expe-
riences a Coriolis force in a direction perpendicular to
the rotation axis and to the velocity of the moving object
(as shown in figure 2). The Coriolis force is calculated
by the following equation F = 2mvˆ×ω . Generally, the
angular rate (ω) is measured by sensing the magnitude
of the Coriolis force exerted on a vibrating proof-mass
within the gyro [11, 52, 54]. The Coriolis force is sensed
by a capacitive sensing structure where a change in the
vibration of the proof-mass causes a change in capaci-
tance which is then converted into a voltage signal by
the internal circuitry. Again the slightest imperfection in
the electro-mechanical structure will introduce idiosyn-
crasies across chips.
Figure 2: MEMS-based gyros use Coriolis force to compute
angular velocity. The Coriolis force induces change in capaci-
tance which is proportional to the angular velocity.
4 Features and Classification Algorithms
In this section we briefly describe the data pre-processing
procedure and the features used in generating a device
3
fingerprint. We also discuss the classification algorithms
and metrics used in our evaluation.
4.1 Data Preprocessing
Data from motion sensors can be thought of as a stream
of timestamped real values. For both accelerometer and
gyroscope we obtain values along three axes. So, for a
given timestamp, t, we have two vectors of the following
form: ~a(t) = (ax,ay,az) and ~ω(t) = (ωx,ωy,ωz). The
accelerometer values include gravity, i.e., when the de-
vice is stationary lying flat on top of a surface we get a
value of 9.81ms−2 along the z-axis. We convert the ac-
celeration vector into a scalar by taking its magnitude:
|~a(t)| =
√
a2x +a2y +a2z . This technique discards some
information, but has the advantage of making the ac-
celerometer data independent of device orientation; e.g.,
if the device is stationary the acceleration magnitude will
always be around 9.81ms−2, whereas the reading on each
individual axis will vary greatly (by +/- 1g) depending
on how the device is held. For the gyroscope we con-
sider data from each axis as a separate stream, since there
is no corresponding baseline rotational acceleration. In
other words, if the device is stationary the rotation rate
across all three axes should be close to 0 rads−1, ir-
respective of the orientation of the device. Thus, our
model considers four streams of sensor data in the form
of {|~a(t)|,ωx(t),ωy(t),ωz(t)}.
For all data streams, we also look at frequency domain
characteristics. But since the browser, running as one of
many applications inside the phone, makes API calls to
collect sensor data the OS might not necessarily respond
in a synchronized manner2. This results in non-equally
spaced data points. We, therefore, use cubic-spline in-
terpolation [40] to construct new data points such that
{|~a(t)|,ωx(t),ωy(t),ωz(t)} become equally-spaced.
4.2 Temporal and Spectral Features
To summarize the characteristics of a sensor data stream,
we explore a total of 25 features consisting of 10 tem-
poral and 15 spectral features (listed in Table 1). All of
these features have been well documented by researchers
in the past. A detailed description of each feature is avail-
able in Appendix A.
4.3 Classification Algorithms and Metrics
Classification Algorithms: Once we have features ex-
tracted from the sensor data, we use supervised learn-
ing to identify the source sensor. Any supervised learn-
2Depending on the load and other applications running, OS might
prioritize such API calls differently.
ing classifier has two main phases: training phase and
testing phase. During training, features from all smart-
phones (i.e., labeled data) are used to train the classifier.
In the test phase, the classifier predicts the the most prob-
able class for a given (unseen) feature vector. We eval-
uate the performance of the following supervised clas-
sifiers — Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive-Bayes
classifier, Multiclass Decision Tree, k-Nearest Neighbor
(k-NN), Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) clas-
sifier and Bagged Decision Trees (Matlab’s Treebagger
model) [17]. We found that in general ensemble based
approaches like Bagged Decision Trees outperform the
other classifiers. We report the maximum achievable
accuracies from these classifiers in the evaluation Sec-
tion 5.
Evaluation metrics: For evaluation metric we use stan-
dard multi-class classification metrics like—precision,
recall, and F-score [53]—in our evaluation. Assuming
there are n classes, we first compute the true positive
(T P) rate for each class, i.e., the number of traces from
the class that are classified correctly. Similarly, we com-
pute the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) as
the number of wrongly accepted and wrongly rejected
traces, respectively, for each class i (1≤ i≤ n). We then
compute precision, recall, and the F-score for each class
using the following equations:
Precision, Pri = T Pi/(T Pi+FPi) (1)
Recall, Rei = T Pi/(T Pi+FNi) (2)
F-Score, Fi = (2×Pri×Rei)/(Pri+Rei) (3)
The F-score is the harmonic mean of precision and re-
call; it provides a good measure of overall classification
performance, since precision and recall represent a trade-
off: a more conservative classifier that rejects more in-
stances will have higher precision but lower recall, and
vice-versa. To obtain the overall performance of the sys-
tem we compute average values in the following way:
Avg. Precision, AvgPr =
∑ni=1 Pri
n
(4)
Avg. Recall, AvgRe =
∑ni=1 Rei
n
(5)
Avg. F-Score, AvgF =
2×AvgPr×AvgRe
AvgPr+AvgRe
(6)
5 Fingerprinting Evaluation
In this section we first describe our experimental setup
(Section 5.1). We then explore features with the aim
to determine the minimal subset of features required to
maximize classification accuracy (Section 5.2). Lastly,
we evaluate our fingerprinting approach under a con-
trolled lab setting (Section 5.3), an uncontrolled real-
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Table 1: Explored acoustic features
# Domain Feature Description
1
Time
Mean The arithmetic mean of the signal strength at different timestamps
2 Standard Deviation Standard deviation of the signal strength
3 Average Deviation Average deviation from mean
4 Skewness Measure of asymmetry about mean
5 Kurtosis Measure of the flatness or spikiness of a distribution
6 RMS Square root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of the signal strength at various timestamps
7 Max Maximum signal strength
8 Min Minimum signal strength
9 ZCR The rate at which the signal changes sign from positive to negative or back
10 Non-Negative count Number of non-negative values
11
Frequency
Spectral Centroid Represents the center of mass of a spectral power distribution
12 Spectral Spread Defines the dispersion of the spectrum around its centroid
13 Spectral Skewness Represents the coefficient of skewness of a spectrum
14 Spectral Kurtosis Measure of the flatness or spikiness of a distribution relative to a normal distribution
15 Spectral Entropy Captures the peaks of a spectrum and their locations
16 Spectral Flatness Measures how energy is spread across the spectrum
17 Spectral Brightness Amount of spectral energy corresponding to frequencies higher than a given cut-off threshold
18 Spectral Rolloff Defines the frequency below which 85% of the distribution magnitude is concentrated
19 Spectral Roughness Average of all the dissonance between all possible pairs of peaks in a spectrum
20 Spectral Irregularity Measures the degree of variation of the successive peaks of a spectrum
21 Spectral RMS Square root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of the signal strength at various frequencies
22 Low-Energy-Rate The percentage of frames with RMS power less than the average RMS power for the whole signal
23 Spectral flux Measure of how quickly the power spectrum of a signal changes
24 Spectral Attack Time Average rise time to spectral peaks
25 Spectral Attack Slope Average slope to spectral peaks
world setting (Section 5.4) and a combination of both
settings (Section 5.5).
5.1 Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup consists of developing our own
web page to collect sensor data3. We use a simple
Javascript to access accelerometer and gyroscope data
(sample code snippet is provided in Appendix C). How-
ever, since we collect data through the browser the maxi-
mum obtainable sampling frequency is lower than avail-
able hardware sampling frequency (restricted by the un-
derlying OS). Table 2 summarizes the sampling frequen-
cies obtained from the top 5 mobile browsers [18]4. We
use a Samsung Galaxy S3 and iPhone 5 to test the sam-
pling frequency of the different browsers. Table 2 also
highlights the motion sensors that are accessible from the
different browsers. We see that Chrome provides the best
sampling frequency while the default Android browser
is the most restrictive browser in terms of not only sam-
pling frequency but also access to different motion sen-
sors. However, Chrome being the most popular mobile
browser [2], we collect data using the Chrome browser.
We start off our data collection from 30 lab-
smartphones. Table 3 lists the distribution of the different
smartphones from which we collect sensor data. Now, as
3http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/SensorFingerprinting.html
4We computed the average time it took to obtain 100 samples. Sam-
ple website available at http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/SamplingFreq.
html
Table 2: Sampling frequency from different browsers
OS Browser Sampling AccessibleFrequency (∼Hz) Sensors∗
Android 4.4
Chrome 100 A,G
Android 20 A
Opera 40 A,G
UC Browser 20 A,G
Standalone App [1] 200 A,G
iOS 8.1.3 Safari 40 A,GStandalone App [3] 100 A,G
∗ here ’A’ means accelerometer and ’G’ refers to gyroscope
gyroscopes react to audio stimulation we collect data un-
der three different background audio settings: no audio,
an inaudible 20 kHz sine wave, or a popular song play-
ing. In the latter two scenarios, the corresponding audio
file plays in the background of the browser while data is
being collected. Under each setting we collect 10 sam-
ples where each sample is about 5 to 8 seconds worth
of data. Now, since our fingerprinting approach aims to
capture the inherent imperfections of motion sensors, we
need to keep the sensors stationary while collecting data.
Therefore, by default, we have the phone placed flat on
a surface while data is being collected, unless explicitly
stated otherwise. We, however, do test our approach for
the scenario where the user is holding the smartphone in
his/her hand while sitting down.
For training and testing the classifiers we randomly
split the dataset in such a way that 50% of data from
each device goes to the training set while the remaining
50% goes to the test set. To prevent any bias in the se-
lection of the training and testing set, we randomize the
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training and testing set 10 times and report the average
F-score. We also compute the 95% confidence interval,
but we found it to be less than 1% and therefore, do not
report it in the rest of the paper. For analyzing and match-
ing fingerprints we use a desktop machine with an Intel
i7-2600 3.4GHz processor with 12GiB RAM. We found
that the average time required to match a new fingerprint
was around 10–100 ms.
Table 3: Types of phones used
Maker Model Quantity
Apple iPhone 5 4iPhone 5s 3
Samsung
Nexus S 14
Galaxy S3 4
Galaxy S4 5
Total 30
5.2 Feature Exploration and Selection
At first glance, it might seem that using all features at
our disposal to identify the device is the optimal strategy.
However, including too many features can worsen per-
formance in practice, due to their varying accuracies and
potentially-conflicting signatures. We, therefore, explore
all the features and determine the subset of features that
optimize our fingerprinting accuracy. For temporal fea-
tures, no transformation of the data stream is required,
but for spectral features we first convert the non-equally
spaced data stream into a fixed-spaced data stream using
cubic spline interpolation. We interpolate at a sampling
rate of 8kHz5. Then, we use the following signal analytic
tools and modules: MIRtoolbox [12] and Libxtract [9]
to extract spectral features. We, next look at feature se-
lection where we explore different combinations of fea-
tures to maximize our fingerprinting accuracy. We use
the FEAST toolbox [49] and utilize the Joint Mutual In-
formation criterion (JMI criterion is known to provide
the best tradeoff in terms of accuracy, stability, and flex-
ibility with small data samples [23]) for ranking the fea-
tures.
Figure 3 shows the results of our feature exploration
for the 30 lab-smartphones. We see that when using only
accelerometer data the F-score seems to flatten after con-
sidering the top 10 features. For gyroscope data we see
that using all the 75 features (25 per data stream) obtains
the best result. And finally when we combine both ac-
celerometer and gyroscope features, the top 70 features
(from a total of 100 features) seems to provide the best
fingerprinting accuracy. Among these top 70 features we
found that 21 of them came from accelerometer features
5Although up-sampling the signal from ∼100 Hz to 8 kHz does not
increase the accuracy of the signal, it does make direct application of
standard signal processing tools more convenient.
and the remaining 59 came from gyroscope features. In
terms of the distribution between temporal and spectral
features, we found that spectral features dominated with
44 of the top 70 features being spectral features. We use
these subset of features in all our latter evaluations.
5.3 Results From Lab Setting
First, we look at fingerprinting smartphones under lab
environment to demonstrate the basic viability of the at-
tack. For this purpose we keep smartphones stationary
on top of a flat surface. Figure 4(a) summarizes our re-
sults. We see that we can almost correctly identify all 30
smartphones under all three scenarios by combining the
accelerometer and gyroscope features. While the benefit
of the background audio stimulation is not visible from
the figure, we will later on show that audio stimulation
do in fact enhance fingerprinting accuracy under coun-
termeasure techniques like calibration and obfuscation
(more in Section 6). Overall these results indicate that
it is indeed possible to fingerprint smartphones through
motion sensors.
5.4 Results From Public Setting
After gaining promising results from our relatively
small-scale lab setting, we set out to expand our data col-
lection process to real-world public setting. We invited
people to voluntarily participate in our study by visit-
ing our web page6 and following a few simple steps to
provide us with sensor data. We recruited participants
through email and online social networks. We asked par-
ticipants to provide data under two settings: no-audio
setting and the inaudible sine-wave setting. (We avoid
the background song to make the experience less bother-
some for the user and more realistic.) Each setting col-
lected sensor data for about one minute, requiring a total
of two minutes of participation. (We did not ask par-
ticipants to provide data under all three settings because
it would require more time which could potentially dis-
courage participants to not fully finish their task.) On
average, we had around 10 samples per setting per de-
vice. Our data-gathering web page plants a cookie in the
form of a large random number (acting as a unique ID)
in the user’s browser, which makes it possible to corre-
late data points coming from the same device. Over the
course of two weeks we received data from a total of 76
devices. However, some participants did not follow all
the steps and as a result we were able to use only 63 of
6Available at http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/
DataCollectionHowPlaced.html. Screenshots of our data collec-
tion webpage is provided in Appendix B. We obtained approval from
our Institutional Research Board (IRB) to perform the data collection.
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Figure 3: Exploring the number optimal features for different sensors. For a) accelerometer more than top 10 features leads to
diminished returns, b) gyroscope all 75 features contribute to obtaining improved accuracy, c) combined sensor data more than 70
features leads to diminished returns.
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Figure 4: Average F-score for different forms of audio stimu-
lation under lab setting. For a) smartphones are kept on top of
a desk while collecting sensor data, b) smartphones are kept in
the hand of the user while collecting sensor data.
the 76 submissions. Figure 5 shows the distribution of
the different devices that participated in our study.
Next, we apply our fingerprinting approach on the
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Figure 5: Distribution of participant device model.
public data set. Figure 6 shows our findings. Compared
to the results from our lab setting, we see a slight de-
crease in F-score but even then we were able to obtain an
F-score of ∼ 94%. Again, the benefit of the audio stim-
ulation is not evident from these results, however, their
benefits will become more visible in the later sections
when we discuss about countermeasure techniques.
5.5 Results From Combined Setting
Finally, we combine our lab data with the publicly col-
lected data to give us a combined dataset containing 93
different smartphones. We apply the same set of evalu-
ations on this combined dataset. Figure 7 highlights our
findings. Again, we see that combining features from
both sensors provides the best result. In this case we
obtained an F-score of ∼ 96%. All these results sug-
gest that smartphones can be successfully fingerprinted
through motion sensors.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
5.6.1 Varying the Number of Devices
We evaluate the accuracy of our classifier while varying
the number of devices. We pick a subset of n devices in
our data set and perform the training and testing steps for
this subset. For each value of n, we repeat the experiment
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Figure 7: Average F-score for different forms of audio stimula-
tion. Results are obtained by combining the publicly collected
data with our lab data giving us a total of 93 devices. All the
smartphones were kept on top of a desk while collecting sensor
data.
10 times, using a different random subset of n devices
each time. In this experiment we consider the use of
both accelerometer and gyroscope features, since those
produce the best performance, and focus on the no au-
dio and sine wave background scenarios. Figure 8 shows
that the F-score generally decreases with large number
of devices, which is expected as an increased number of
labels makes classification more difficult. Extrapolating
from the graph, we expect classification to remain accu-
rate even for significantly larger data sets.
5.6.2 Varying Training Set Size
We also consider how varying the training set size im-
pacts the fingerprinting accuracy. For this experiment
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Figure 8: Average F-score for different numbers of smart-
phones. F-score generally tends to decrease slightly as more
devices are considered.
we vary the ratio of training and testing set size. For
this experiment we only look at data from our lab set-
ting as some of the devices from our public setting did
not have exactly 10 samples. We also consider the set-
ting where there is no background audio stimulation and
use the combined features of accelerometer and gyro-
scope. Figure 9 shows our findings. While an increased
training size improves classification accuracy, even with
mere two training samples (of a few seconds each) are
sufficient to achieve an F-score of ∼ 98, with increased
training set sizes producing an F-score of over 99%.
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Figure 9: Average F-score for different ratio of training and
test data. With only two training data we achieved a F-score of
∼ 98%
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6 Countermeasures
So far we have focused on showing how easy it is to fin-
gerprint smartphones through motion sensors. We now
shift our focus on providing a systematic approach to de-
fending against such fingerprinting techniques. We pro-
pose two approaches: sensor calibration and data obfus-
cation.
6.1 Calibration
Bojinov et al. [21] observe that their phones have cal-
ibration errors, and use these calibration differences as
a mechanism to distinguish between them. In particu-
lar, they consider an affine error model: aM = g · a+ o,
where a is the true acceleration along an axis and aM is
the measured value of the sensor. The two error param-
eters are the offset o (bias away from 0) and the gain
g which magnifies or diminishes the acceleration value.
Our classification uses many features, but we find that
the mean signal value is the most discriminating feature
for each of the sensor streams, which is closely related to
the offset. We therefore explore whether calibrating the
sensors will make them more difficult to fingerprint. We
note that calibration has a side effect of improving the ac-
curacy of sensor readings and is therefore of independent
value. We perform the calibration only on the sensors in
our 30 lab smartphones because we felt that calibration
is too time consuming for the volunteers. Moreover, we
could better control the quality of the calibration process
when carried out in the lab.
First, let us briefly describe the sensor coordinate sys-
tem as the sensor framework using a standard 3-axis co-
ordinate system to express data values. For most sen-
sors, the coordinate system is defined relative to the de-
vice’s screen when the device is held in its default ori-
entation (shown in figure 10). When the device is held
in its default orientation, the positive x-axis is horizon-
tal and points to the right, the positive y-axis is vertical
and points up, and the positive z-axis points toward the
outside of the screen face7. We compute offset and gain
error in all three axes.
Calibrating the Accelerometer: Considering both off-
set and gain error, the measured output of the accelerom-
eter (aM = [aMx ,a
M
y ,a
M
z ]) can be expressed as: aMxaMy
aMz
=
 OxOy
Oz
+
Sx 0 00 Sy 0
0 0 Sz
 axay
az
 (7)
where S = [Sx,Sy,Sz] and O = [Ox,Oy,Oz] respectively
represents the gain and offset errors along all three axes
7Android and iOS consider the positive and negative direction along
an axis differently.
(a = [ax,ay,az] refers to the actual acceleration). In
the ideal world [Sx,Sy,Sz] = [1,1,1] and [Ox,Oy,Oz] =
[0,0,0], but in reality they differ from the desired values.
To compute the offset and gain error of an axis, we need
data along both the positive and negative direction of that
axis (one measures positive +g while the other measures
negative −g). In other words, six different static posi-
tions are used where in each position one of the axes is
aligned either along or opposite to earth’s gravity. This
causes the a= [ax,ay,az] vector to take one of the follow-
ing six possible values {[±g,0,0], [0,±g,0], [0,0,±g]}.
For example, if aMz+ and a
M
z− are two values of accelerom-
eter reading along the positive and negative z-axis, then
we can compute the offset (Oz) and gain (Sz) error using
the following equation:
Sz =
aMz+−aMz−
2g
, Oz =
aMz+−aMz−
2
(8)
We take 10 measurements along all six directions
(±x,±y,±z) from all our lab devices as shown in Fig-
ure 10. From these measurements we compute the av-
erage offset and gain error along all three axes using
equation (8). Figure 11 shows a scatter-plot of the er-
rors along z−axis for 30 smartphones (each point rep-
resents a single device). We can see that the devices are
scattered around allover the plot which signifies that dif-
ferent devices have different amount of offset and gain
error. Such unique distinction makes fingerprinting fea-
sible.
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Figure 11: Accelerometer offset and gain error of from 30
smartphones.
Calibrating the Gyroscope: Calibrating gyroscope is
a harder problem as we need to induce a fixed angular
change to determine the offset and gain error. Similar to
accelerometer we can also represent the measured output
of the gyroscope (ωM = [ωMx ,ωMy ,ωMz ]) using the follow-
ing equation: ωMxωMy
ωMz
=
 OxOy
Oz
+
Sx 0 00 Sy 0
0 0 Sz
 ωxωy
ωz
 (9)
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Figure 10: Calibrating accelerometer along three axes. We collect measurements along all 6 directions (±x,±y,±z).
where again S = [Sx,Sy,Sz] and O = [Ox,Oy,Oz] respec-
tively represents the gain and offset errors along all three
axes. Here, ω = [ωx,ωy,ωz]) represents the ideal/actual
angular velocity. Ideally all gain and offset errors should
be equal to 1 and 0 respectively. But in the real world
when the device is rotated by a fixed amount of angle,
the measured angle tends to deviate from the actual an-
gular displacement (shown in figure 12(a)). This impacts
any system that uses gyroscope for angular-displacement
measurements.
α
α
Smartphoneα
Actual rotation = α
Measured rotation =
(a)
Smartphone
180 o
(b)
Figure 12: a) Offset and gain error in gyroscope impact sys-
tems that use them for angular displacement measurements. b)
Calibrating the gyroscope by rotating the device by 180◦ in the
positive x-axis direction.
To calibrate gyroscope we again need to collect data
along all six different directions (±x,±y,±z) individu-
ally, but this time instead of keeping the device station-
ary we need to rotate the device by a fixed amount of
angle (θ ). In our setting, we set θ = 180◦ (or pi rad).
For example, Figure 12(b) shows how we rotate the the
smartphone by 180◦ around the positive x-axis. The an-
gular displacement along any direction can be computed
from gyroscope data in the following manner:
ωMi = Oi+Siω, i ∈ {±x,±y,±z}∫ t
0
ωMi dt =
∫ t
0
Oi dt+Si
∫ t
0
ω dt
θMi = Oit+Siθ (10)
where t refers to the time it took to rotate the device by
θ angle with a fixed angular velocity of ω . Now, for
any two measurements along the opposite directions of
an axis we can compute the offset and gain error using
the following equation:
Oi =
θMi++θMi−
t1− t2 , Si =
θMi+−θMi−−Oi(t1− t2)
2pi
(11)
where i ∈ {x,y,z} and t1 and t2 represents the times-
pan of the positive and negative measurement respec-
tively. We take 10 measurements along all six directions
(±x,±y,±z) and compute the average offset and gain er-
ror along all three axes. However, since its practically
impossible to manually rotate the device a fixed angular
velocity, the integration in equation (10) will introduce
noise and therefore, the calculated errors will at best be
approximations of the real errors. We also approximate
the integral using trapezoidal rule which will introduce
some more errors.
We next visualize the offset and gain error obtained
from the gyroscopes of 30 smartphones (only showing
for z-axis). Figure 13 shows our findings. We see simi-
lar results compared to accelerometers where devices are
scattered around at different regions of the plot. This
suggests that gyroscopes exhibit different range of offset
of and gain error across different units.
Fingerprinting Calibrated Data: In this section we
look at how calibrating sensors impacts the fingerprint-
ing accuracy. For this setting, we first correct the raw
values by removing the the offset and gain errors be-
fore extracting features from them. That is, the calibrated
value aC = aM/g− o. We then generate fingerprints on
the corrected data and train the classifiers on the new
fingerprints. Figure 14 shows the average F-score for
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Figure 13: Gyroscope offset and gain error of 30 smartphones.
calibrated data under three scenarios, considering both
cases where the devices were kept on top of desk and
in the hand of a user. When we compare the results
from uncalibrated data (figure 4) to those from calibrated
data, we see that the F-score reduces by almost 30% for
accelerometer data but not as much for the gyroscope
data. This suggests that we were able to calibrate the ac-
celerometer much more precisely than the gyroscope, as
expected given the more complex and error-prone man-
ual calibration procedure for the gyroscope. Another in-
teresting observation is that audio stimulation provides
a significant improvement in classifier accuracy. This
suggests that audio stimulation does not influence (and
perhaps even hinders) the dominant features removed by
the calibration, but does significantly impact secondary
features that come into play once calibration is carried
out. Overall, our results demonstrate that calibration is
a promising technique, especially if more precise mea-
surements can be made. Manufacturers should be en-
couraged to perform better calibration to both improve
the accuracy of their sensors and to help protect users’
privacy.
6.2 Data Obfuscation
Basic Obfuscation: Rather than remove the calibration
errors, we can instead add extra noise to hide the calibra-
tion. This approach has the advantage of not requiring a
calibration step, which requires user intervention and is
particularly difficult for the gyroscope sensors. As such,
the obfuscation technique could be deployed with an op-
erating system update. Obfuscation, however, adds extra
noise and can therefore negatively impact the utility of
the sensors (in contrast to calibration, which improves
their utility). We therefore first consider small obfusca-
tion values in the range that is similar to what we ob-
served in the calibration errors above. Adding noise in
this range is roughly equivalent to switching to a differ-
ently (mis)calibrated phone and therefore should cause
minimal impact to the user.
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Figure 14: Average F-score for calibrated data under lab set-
ting. Results obtained from 30 smartphones where the smart-
phones were kept a) on top of a desk b) in the hand of the user
while collecting sensor data.
To add obfuscation noise, we compute aO = aM ∗gO+
oO, where gO and oO are the obfuscation gain and offset,
respectively. Based on Figures 11 and 13, we choose a
range of [-0.5,0.5] for the accelerometer offset, [-0.1,0.1]
for the gyroscope offset, and [0.95,1.05] for the gain.
For each session, we pick uniformly random obfusca-
tion gain and offset values from the range; by varying
the obfuscation values we make it difficult to fingerprint
repeated visits. Figure 15 summarizes our findings when
we apply obfuscation to all the sensor data obtained from
our 30 lab smartphones. Compared to unaltered data
(figure 4), data obfuscation seems to provide significant
improvement in terms of reducing the average F-score.
Depending on the type of audio stimulation F-score re-
duces by almost 10–25% when smartphones are kept sta-
tionary on the desk and by 20–45% when smartphones
are kept stationary in the hand of the user. The impact
of audio stimulation in fingerprinting motion sensors is
much more visible in these results. We see that F-score
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increases by almost 15% when a song is being played
in the background; again, we expect this to be a conse-
quence of us having hidden the calibration errors that are
the primary discriminant between phones.
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Figure 15: Average F-score for obfuscated data under lab set-
ting. Results obtained from 30 smartphones where the smart-
phones were kept a) on top of a desk b) in the hand of the user
while collecting sensor data.
Next, we apply similar techniques to the public and
combined dataset. We apply the same range of offset and
gain errors to the raw values before generating finger-
prints. Figure 16 summarizes our results for both pres-
ence and absence of audio stimulation. We see that F-
score reduces by approximately 20–40% (Figure 14(a)).
We expect the lower accuracy is a consequence of a
larger data set, suggesting that for even larger sets the im-
pact of obfuscation is likely to be even more pronounced.
Increasing the Obfuscation Range: We next look
at how the fingerprinting technique reacts to different
ranges of obfuscation. Starting with our base ranges
of [−0.5,0.5] and [−0.1,0.1] for the accelerometer and
gyroscope offsets, respectively, and [0.95,1.05] for the
gain, we linearly scale the ranges and observe the im-
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Figure 16: Average F-score for different forms of audio stim-
ulation for obfuscated data. Results obtained from a) 63 public
smartphones b) 93 smartphones (by combining the 63 public
smartphones with our 30 lab phones) where the smartphones
were kept on top of a desk while collecting sensor data.
pact on the average F-score. We scale all ranges by the
same amount, increasing the ranges symmetrically on
both sides of the interval midpoint.
For this experimental setup we only consider the com-
bined dataset as this contains the most number of devices
(93 in total). We also restrict ourselves to the setting
where we combine both the accelerometer and gyroscope
features because this provides the optimal result (as evi-
dent from all our past results). Figure 17 highlights our
findings. As we can see increasing the obfuscation range
does reduce F-score but it has a diminishing return. For
10x increment, the F-score drops down to approximately
40% and 55% for no-audio and audio stimulation respec-
tively. Beyond 10x increment (not shown) the reduction
in F-score is minimal (at most 10% reduction at 50x in-
crement). This result suggests that simply obfuscating
the raw values is not sufficient to hide all unique charac-
teristics of the sensors. So far we have only manipulated
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the signal value but did not alter any of the frequency
features and as a result the classifier is still able to utilize
the spectral features to uniquely distinguish individual
devices.
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Figure 17: Impact of obfuscation range as the range is linearly
scaled up from 1x to 10x of the base range.
Enhanced Obfuscation: Given that we know that the
spectral features are not impacted my our obfuscation
techniques, we now focus on adding noise to the fre-
quency of the sensor signal. Our data injection procedure
is described in algorithm 1. The main idea is to proba-
bilistically insert a modified version of the current data
point in between the past and current timestamp where
the timestamp itself is randomly selected. Doing so will
influence cubic interpolation of the data stream which in
turn will impact the spectral features extracted from the
data stream.
Algorithm 1 Obfuscated Data Injection
Input: Time series Data D[t], Probability Pr,
Obfuscation Range Obf range, Offset O, Gain S
Output: Modified Data Stream MD[t]
lasttimestamp← Null
offset← Null
gain← Null
#Random(range) : randomly selects a value in range
for i = 1 to length(D) do
#New data insertion
if i > 1 and Random([0,1])< Pr then
offset← Random(Obf range)
gain← Random(Obf range)
time← Random([i, lasttimestamp])
D[time]← InsertData(D[i],offset,gain)
end if
#Original Data
D[i]← InsertData(D[i],O,S)
lasttimestamp← i
end for
return MD
To evaluate our approach we first fix a obfuscation
range. We choose 10x of the base range from the previ-
ous section as our fixed obfuscation range. We then vary
the probability of data injection from [0,1]. Figure 18
shows our findings. We can see that even with relatively
small amount of data injection (≤ 0.4) we can reduce the
average F-score to ≈15–20% depending on what type of
input stimulation is applied.
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Figure 18: Impact of randomly inserting new data points.
7 Deployment Considerations
We envision our obfuscation technique as a middle-ware,
sitting between the OS and user application. Under de-
fault setting data is always obfuscated unless the user ex-
plicitly allows an application to access unaltered sensor
data. For example, a 3-D game might need access to raw
accelerometer and gyroscope data instead of the obfus-
cated data to operate properly, in which case this will be
noticeable to the user who can then provide the appropri-
ate permission to the application. Our default obfuscated
setting will ensure that users do not have to worry about
applications like browser accessing sensor data without
their awareness.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we show that motion sensors such as ac-
celerometers and gyroscopes can be used to uniquely
identify smartphones. The more concerning matter is
that these sensors can be surreptitiously accessed from
the browser without user awareness. We also show that
injecting audio stimulation in the background improves
detection rate as sensors like gyroscopes react to acoustic
stimulation differently.
Our countermeasure techniques, however, mitigate
such threats by obfuscating anomalies in sensor data. We
were able to significantly reduce fingerprinting accuracy
by employing a simple, yet effective obfuscation tech-
nique that injects random data points inside the generated
sensor data-stream. As a general conclusion we suggest
using our obfuscation technique in the absence of explicit
user permission/awareness.
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A Feature Description
Mean Signal Value: This feature computes the arith-
metic mean of a signal amplitude. In the case of a set of
N values {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, the mean value is given by the
following formula:
µ =
1
N
(x1+ x2+ · · ·+ xN) (12)
The mean value provides an approximation of the aver-
age signal strength.
Signal Variance: This feature computes the dispersion
in signal strength. For a set of N values {x1,x2, . . . ,xN},
the standard deviation is given by the following formula:
σ =
√
1
N
N
∑
i=1
(xi−µ)2 (13)
where µ refers to the mean signal strength. Variance
measures the spread of a signal strength.
Average Deviation: This feature measures the average
distance from mean. In the case of a set of N values
{x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, the average deviation is computes using
the following formula:
AvgDev =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
|xi−µ| (14)
where µ refers to the mean signal strength.
Skewness: This feature measures asymmetry about
mean. For a set of N values {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, the skew-
ness is computed as:
γ1 =
1
N
(
N
∑
i=1
(
xi−µ
σ
)3
)
(15)
where µ and σ respectively represents the mean and
standard deviation of signal strength.
Kurtosis: This feature measures the flatness or
spikiness of a distribution. For a set of N values
{x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, the kurtosis is computed as:
β1 =
1
N
(
N
∑
i=1
(
xi−µ
σ
)4
)
(16)
where µ and σ respectively represents the mean and
standard deviation of signal strength.
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Root-Mean-Square (RMS) Energy: This feature com-
putes the square root of the arithmetic mean of the
squares of the original audio signal strength at vari-
ous frequencies. In the case of a set of N values
{x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, the RMS value is given by the follow-
ing formula:
xrms =
√
1
n
(
x21+ x
2
2+ · · ·+ x2N
)
(17)
The RMS value provides an approximation of the aver-
age audio signal strength.
Zero Crossing Rate (ZCR): The zero-crossing rate is
the rate at which the signal changes sign from positive to
negative or back [24]. ZCR for a signal s of length T can
be defined as:
ZCR =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
|s(t)− s(t−1)| (18)
where s(t) = 1 if the signal has a positive amplitude at
time t and 0 otherwise. Zero-crossing rates provide a
measure of the noisiness of the signal.
Low Energy Rate: The low energy rate computes the
percentage of frames (typically 50ms chunks) with RMS
power less than the average RMS power for the whole
signal.
Spectral Centroid: The spectral centroid represents
the “center of mass” of a spectral power distribution. It
is calculated as the weighted mean of the frequencies
present in the signal, determined using a fourier trans-
form, with their magnitudes as the weights:
Centroid,µ = ∑
N
i=1 fi ·mi
∑Ni=1 mi
(19)
where mi represents the magnitude of bin number i, and
fi represents the center frequency of that bin.
Spectral Entropy: Spectral entropy captures the spik-
iness of a spectral distribution. To compute spectral en-
tropy, a Digital Fourier Transform (DFT) of the signal is
first carried out. Next, the frequency spectrum is con-
verted into a probability mass function (PMF) by nor-
malizing the spectrum using the following equation:
wi =
mi
∑Ni=1 mi
(20)
where mi represents the energy/magnitude of the i-
th frequency component of the spectrum. w =
(w1,w2, . . . ,wN) is the PMF of the spectrum and N is the
number of points in the spectrum. This PMF can then be
used to compute the spectral entropy using the following
equation:
H =
N
∑
i=1
wi · log2wi (21)
The central idea of using entropy as a feature is to capture
the peaks of the spectrum and their location.
Spectral Spread: Spectral spread defines the dispersion
of the spectrum around its centroid, i.e., it measures the
standard deviation of the spectral distribution. So it can
be computed as:
Spread,σ =
√
N
∑
i=1
[( fi−µ)2 ·wi] (22)
where wi represents the weight of the i-th frequency com-
ponent obtained from equation (20) and µ represents the
centroid of the spectrum obtained from equation (19).
Spectral Skewness: Spectral skewness computes the
coefficient of skewness of a spectrum. Skewness (third
central moment) measures the symmetry of the distribu-
tion. A distribution can be positively skewed in which
case it has a long tail to the right while a negatively-
skewed distribution has a longer tail to the left. A sym-
metrical distribution has a skewness of zero. The coef-
ficient of skewness is the ratio of the skewness to the
standard deviation raised to the third power.
Skewness =
∑Ni=1
[
( fi−µ)3 ·wi
]
σ3
(23)
Spectral Kurtosis: Spectral Kurtosis gives a measure
of the flatness or spikiness of a distribution relative to a
normal distribution. It is computed from the fourth cen-
tral moment using the following function:
Kurtosis =
∑Ni=1
[
( fi−µ)4 ·wi
]
σ4
(24)
A kurtosis value of 3 means the distribution is similar
to a normal distribution whereas values less than 3 refer
to flatter distributions and values greater than 3 refers to
steeper distributions.
Spectral Flatness: Spectral flatness measures how en-
ergy is spread across the spectrum, giving a high value
when energy is equally distributed and a low value when
energy is concentrated in a small number of narrow fre-
quency bands. The spectral flatness is calculated by di-
viding the geometric mean of the power spectrum by the
arithmetic mean of the power spectrum [34]:
Flatness =
[
∏Ni=1 mi
]1/N
1
N ∑
N
i=1 mi
(25)
where mi represents the magnitude of bin number i. One
advantage of using spectral flatness is that it is not af-
fected by the amplitude of the signal.
Spectral Brightness: Spectral brightness calculates the
amount of spectral energy corresponding to frequencies
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higher than a given cut-off threshold. Spectral brightness
can be computed using the following equation:
Brightness fc =
N
∑
i= fc
mi (26)
where fc is the cut-off frequency (set to 1500Hz) and mi
is the magnitude of the i-th frequency component of the
spectrum.
Spectral Rolloff: The spectral rolloff is defined as the
frequency below which 85% of the distribution magni-
tude is concentrated [55]
argmin
fc∈{1,...,N}
fc
∑
i=1
mi ≥ 0.85 ·
N
∑
i=1
mi (27)
where fc is the rolloff frequency and mi is the magnitude
of the i-th frequency component of the spectrum.
Spectral Irregularity: Spectral irregularity measures
the degree of variation of the successive peaks of a spec-
trum. This feature provides the ability to capture the jitter
or noise in spectrum. Spectral irregularity is computed as
the sum of the square of the difference in amplitude be-
tween adjoining spectral peaks [33] using the following
equation:
Irregularity =
∑Ni=1(ai−ai+1)2
∑Ni=1 a2i
(28)
where the (N + 1)-th peak is assumed to be zero. A
change in irregularity changes the perceived timbre of
a sound.
Spectral Flux: Spectral flux is a measure of how
quickly the power spectrum of a signal changes. It is
calculated by taking the average Euclidean distance be-
tween the power spectrum of two contiguous frames.
Spectral Attack Time: This features computes the av-
erage rise time to spectral attacks where spectral attacks
are local maxima in the spectrum [37].
Spectral Attack Slope: This features computes the av-
erage slope to spectral attacks where spectral attacks are
local maxima in the spectrum [37].
B Screenshot of Our Data Collection Web-
page
We provide screenshots (see figure 19) of our data col-
lection website to give a better idea of how participants
were asked to participate.
Figure 19: Screenshot of our data collection website.
C Accessing Motion Sensors From
Browser
To access motion sensors the DeviceMotion class needs
to be initialized. A sample JavaScript snippet is given
below:
if(window.DeviceMotionEvent!=undefined){
window.addEventListener(’devicemotion’, motionHandler);
window.ondevicemotion = motionHandler;
}
function motionHandler(event) {
agx = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.x;
agy = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.y;
agz = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.z;
ai = event.interval;
rR = event.rotationRate;
if (rR != null) {
arAlpha = rR.alpha;
arBeta = rR.beta ;
arGamma = rR.gamma;
}
}
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